MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers that inbound SMTP for your domain requires TLS with a valid certificate. It closes the “opportunistic TLS” downgrade attack that STARTTLS alone allows.
How It’s Published
Two pieces:
-
A DNS TXT record at
_mta-sts.example.comdeclaring the policy exists:_mta-sts.example.com. TXT "v=STSv1; id=20260901T000000;" -
A policy file served over HTTPS at
https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt:version: STSv1 mode: enforce mx: *.mail.example.com max_age: 604800
Modes
testing— report failures but still deliverenforce— refuse delivery on TLS or MX mismatchnone— retracting the policy
Why It Matters
Without MTA-STS, an attacker on-path between the sender and your MX can strip STARTTLS, force plaintext SMTP, and read/tamper with mail. MTA-STS makes the sender fail closed instead of silently downgrading.
Related
Check the TLS-RPT glossary entry, read what DMARC is, and see what an SSL certificate is.